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Control Over Personal Information: Who Has
It, The Consumer or the Industry?
Antonia Runac
I. INTRODUCTION
Have you ever found yourself at home on a Sunday evening
reading the newspaper, watching television, or spending time with
your family when you receive a telephone call from your
telecommunications carrier attempting to sell you additional products
and services? You may have found yourself wondering whether you
purchased a service that entitled your communications carrier to
contact you at home on a Sunday evening to market additional
services. If you knew you could stop these calls from your carrier,
would you?
The 10th Circuit in U.S. West, Inc. v. Federal Communications
Commission vacated a 1998 FCC Order which interpreted Section 222 of
the Telecommunications Act of 1996 and adopted regulations to restrict
telecommunications carriers' ability to use confidential customer
information. 1 The court ruled that the Federal Communications
Commission's ("FCC") regulations could not withstand First
Amendment scrutiny 2 under the Supreme Court's test in Central
Hudson Gas & Electric Corporationv. Public Service Commission of New
York. 3 The 10th Circuit's decision has vast implications for consumers
and their ability to control personal information.
Part II of this student article first discusses the FCC regulations
at issue in U.S. West and then identifies the elements of the Central
Hudson test which were applied by the 10th Circuit. Part III discusses
the U.S. West decision. Part IV analyzes the U.S. West decision as it
applied the CentralHudson analysis. Part V explores the implications of
the decision on consumers and questions whether the consumer
actually has control over his personal information.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Section 222 of The Telecommunications Act of 1996
1. Overview of The Language of Section 222
Congress' goal in passing the Telecommunications Act of 1996 ("FCA")
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was to establish a "'new pro-competitive, deregulatory national policy
framework' that would replace the statutory and regulatory limitations on
competition" in the telecommunications industry.4 While the TCA paved
the way for new telecommunications technologies and competitive
market forces, it also carried the risk of curbing consumer privacy
interests. 5 Congress' attempt to strike a balance between consumer
privacy and competitive interests relating to the telecommunications
industry resulted in the enactment of Section 222 of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 ("TCA").6
Section 222 is entitled "Privacy of customer information" and
states that "every telecommunications carrier has a duty to protect the
confidentiality of proprietary information of, and relating
to.. .customers." 7 In order to protect consumer privacy, Section 222
places restrictions on the use of customer proprietary network
information ("CPNI") obtained by telecommunications carriers in
providing telecommunications service to customers. 8 Section 222(f)(1)
defines customer proprietary network information as:
"(A) information that relates to the quantity, technical
configuration, type,destination, and amount of use of a
telecommunications service subscribed to by any
customer of a telecommunications carrier, and that is
made available to the carrier by the customer solely by
virtue of the carrier-customer relationship; and
(B) information contained in the bills pertaining to
telephone exchangeservice or telephone toll service
received by a customer of a carrier; except that such term
does not include subscriber list information." 9
Simply put, CPNI is information that the carrier obtains from the
customer in its provision of a telecommunications service.
Furthermore, restrictions on use, disclosure, or access of CPNI are
embodied in Section 222(c)(1) which states the following:
"Except as required by law or with the approval of the
customer, a telecommunications carrier that receives or
obtains customer proprietary network information by
virtue of its provision of a telecommunications service
shall only use, disclose, or permit access to individually
identifiable customer proprietary network information in
its provision of (A) the telecommunications service from
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which such information is derived, or (B) services
necessary to, or used in, the provision of such
telecommunications service, including the publishing of
directories." 10
In other words, unless the carrier has customer approval, a
telecommunications carrier may not use, disclose, or permit access to
CPNI for purposes unrelated to the service from which the information
is derived. Finally, Section 222(d) provides three exceptions to the
privacy requirements elucidated in Section 222(c)(1). A
telecommunications carrier may use, disclose, or permit access to
CPNI:
"(1) to initiate, render, bill and collect for
telecommunications services;
(2) to protect the rights or property of the carrier, or to
protect users of those services and other carriers from
fraudulent, abusive, or unlawful use of, or subscription
to, such services; or
(3) to provide any inbound telemarketing, referral, or
administrative services to the customer for the duration
of the call, if such call was initiated by the customer and
the customer approves of the use of such information to
provide such service." 11
On the most fundamental level, Congress' language indicates that a
telecommunications carrier is prohibited from using, disclosing, or
permitting access to CPNI in a manner not delineated in Section 222,
unless it obtains customer approval.
2. The FCC Regulations Implementing Section 222
The FCC released its Second Report and Order on February 26,
1998 ("CPNI Order") which promulgated regulations to implement
Section 222 of the TCA relating to telecommunications carriers' use of
CPNI.12 The purpose of the CPNI Order was to resolve questions for
telecommunications carriers regarding their statutory obligations
under Section 222.13 The two most pervasive concerns that carriers
expressed were: what the term "telecommunications service" meant
under Section 222(c)(1) and what form of customer approval is
Loyola Consumer Law Review

Volume 12, Number

required under Section 222(c)(1).14
Although the 10th Circuit vacated the FCC's order on the
grounds that the government chose a form of approval that raises
constitutional doubt, a brief background of the government's approach
to both concerns expressed by carriers is informative.
a. The Total Service Approach
The FCC regulations interpret Section 222(c)(1) by means of a
structure known as the "total service approach." 15 Under this
framework, the term "telecommunications service" is divided into
three categories: (1) local service; (2) interexchange service (most longdistance service); and (3) commercial mobile radio service ("CMRS")
(mobile or cellular service).1 6 The regulations state that a carrier may
use, disclose, or permit access to CPNI "for the purpose of providing
or marketing service offerings among the categories of service (i.e.,
local, interexchange, and CMRS) already subscribed to by the customer
from the same carrier, without customer approval." 17
In other words, a carrier is permitted to use, disclose, or share
CPNI for marketing purposes within a category of service, without
customer approval, as long as the customer already subscribes to that
category of service. 18 In turn, a carrier may not use, disclose or permit
access to CPNI to market categories of service to which the customer
does not subscribe unless the carrier obtains customer approval. 1 9
The total service approach "allows carriers to use the customer's
entire record, derived from the complete service subscribed to from
that carrier, for marketing purposes within the existing service
relationship." 20 For example, "a carrier whose customer subscribes to
service that includes a combination of local service and CMRS would
be able to use CPNI derived from this entire service to market to that
customer all related offerings, but not to market long distance service
to that customer because the customer's service excludes any long
distance component." 21 If the customer has subscribed to a service,
carriers are permitted to use CPNI to market offerings related to that
service.
Finally, the regulations prohibit a carrier from using, without
customer approval, CPNI gained from any of the three mentioned
services to (1) market customer premises equipment ("CPE") or
information services (i.e., call answering, voice mail, Internet access
services); (2) identify or track customers who call competing carriers;
and (3) to regain the business of a former customer.22
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b. Customer Approval
Section 222(c)(1) does not indicate what form customer approval
should take in relation to use, disclosure, and access to CPNI.
Nonetheless, the regulations implement an "opt-in" approach. 23 This
approach requires a carrier to obtain prior express approval from a
customer through written, oral or electronic methods. 24 The FCC
determined that an express approval mechanism would be the best
way to further Congress' desire to "protect privacy and competitive
interests, while preserving the customer's ability to control
dissemination of sensitive information." 25 In addition, the regulations
state that if a carrier obtains express approval for the use of CPNI
outside of the customer's total service relationship, the approval must
stay in effect until the customer revokes or limits the approval. 26
Finally, before a carrier can solicit customer approval, it must provide
the customer a one-time notification of his right to restrict the use of,
disclosure of, and access to his CPNI.27
B. The First Amendment and Commercial Speech: Central Hudson Gas &
Electric Corporation v. Public Service Commission of New York
In CentralHudson Gas & Electric Corporationv. Public Service
Commission of New York ("Central Hudson"), the United States Supreme
Court reversed the New York Court of Appeals' decision sustaining a
regulation of the New York Public Service Commission which banned,
in totality, promotional advertising by an electrical utility.28 The
regulation was based on the Commission's finding that the
interconnected utility system in the state of New York did not have a
sufficient fuel supply to satisfy consumer demands for the 1973-74
winter. 29 The Supreme Court held that the regulation violated the First
and Fourteenth Amendments because the state's complete suppression
of commercial speech was more extensive than necessary to further the
state's asserted interest in energy conservation. 30
The Supreme Court has defined commercial speech as
"expression related solely to the economic interests of the speaker and
its audience." 31 Likewise, commercial expression "assists consumers
and furthers the societal interest in the fullest possible dissemination of
information." 32 Accordingly, commercial speech is protected by the
First Amendment, as applied to the States through the Fourteenth
Amendment, from unjustified governmental regulation. 33 However,
the Supreme Court noted that commercial speech is afforded lesser
protection than other constitutionally guaranteed expression. 34 Thus,
Loyola Consumer Law Review
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in order to determine what protection shall be afforded commercial
expression, the Court will examine the nature of the expression and the
governmental interests served by its regulation. 35
To preserve the informational function of advertising, the
government may prohibit forms of commercial speech that are
misleading or related to unlawful activity.36 As a general rule,

commercial messages that give the public accurate information about a
lawful activity, such as the sale of a product or service, may not be
regulated by the government. 37 However, the government may
regulate commercial speech if it is intended to deceive the public. 38 If
the communication is neither misleading nor related to unlawful
activity, the government must assert a substantial interest for its
restrictions on commercial speech. 39 Thus, the initial inquiry in cases
determining the constitutionality of government regulation of
commercial speech is whether the communication is not misleading
and concerns lawful activity.40

As noted, if the court finds that the communication is not
misleading and concerns a lawful activity, the court must then ask
whether the government has asserted a substantial interest in
restricting commercial speech. 41 If the asserted government interest is
substantial, the court will then determine whether the limitation on
commercial expression is proportional to the interest. 42 The Court has
espoused two criteria by which this requirement can be assessed.43
First, the regulation must directly advance the asserted governmental
interest. 44 Second, if the government's asserted interest can be
furthered by less restrictive means, the "excessive restrictions cannot
survive." 45
The Supreme Court held that the electrical utility's promotional
advertising was protected commercial speech because it increased the
amount of information available for consumer decisions. 46 The Court
also held that based on "our country's dependence on energy
resources beyond our control," the state had a substantial interest in
energy conservation and the state's interest was directly advanced by
the order.47 However, the Court concluded that the state's complete
ban on promotional advertising, which is commercial speech protected
by the First and Fourteenth Amendments, was more extensive than
necessary to further the state's interest. 48 The Court held that instead of
completely banning promotional advertising, the state could have
attempted to restrict the content of the advertising by requiring
"advertisements to include information about the relative efficiency
and expense of the offered service, both under current conditions and
the foreseeable future."49
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The Supreme Court's four part analysis in CentralHudson can be
summarized as follows: (1) Is the expression protected by the First
Amendment; (2) Is the asserted governmental interest substantial; (3)
Does the regulation directly advance the governmental interest; and (4)
Is the regulation more extensive than necessary to serve that interest? 50
III. U.S. WEST, INC. V. FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS
COMMISSION
In U.S. West, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission, U.S.
West, Inc., challenged the FCC's CPNI Order on the grounds that the
regulations interpreting Section 222 of the TCA, which required
telecommunications companies to obtain express approval from a
customer before the company can use the customer's CPNI violated
the First and Fifth Amendments.51 The United States Court of Appeals,
10th Circuit, vacated the FCC's CPNI Order, concluding that the
regulations violated the First Amendment. 52 The 10th Circuit held: "(1)
CPNI was 'commercial speech,' for purposes of the First Amendment's
free speech clause; (2) FCC failed to show that its regulations directly
and materially advanced FCC's asserted interests in privacy and
increased competition; and (3) the regulations were not narrowly
tailored to further those asserted interests." 53
A. Standard of Review
The appropriate standard of review in cases where a final FCC order
and interpretation of a federal statute are at issue is governed by the
Administrative Procedure Act and the standard set forth by the U.S. Supreme
Court in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NaturalResources Defense Council,Inc.54 Under
the Administrative Procedure Act, the court will determine whether the FCC
order is "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with the law," or "contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege,
or immunity."55 In addition, when an agency's interpretation of a statute is at
issue, the court will apply the two-step approach espoused by the Court in
Chevron: (1) If Congress has addressed the question at issue, the court must
give effect to Congress' express intent; (2) If Congress has not spoken to the
question at issue (the statute is silent or ambiguous), the court will defer to the
agency's interpretation as long as it is reasonable.5 6 However, if the agency
interpretation is unconstitutional, it will not be given Chevron deference. 57 Not
only will an agency interpretation not be given deference if it is unquestionably
unconstitutional, it will also not be given deference if it raises "serious
constitutional questions."58
Loyola Consumer Law Review
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B. Applying Central Hudson to U.S. West, Inc.
1. Do CPNI Regulations Implicate the FirstAmendment?
The 10th Circuit rejected the government's argument that the
FCC's CPNI regulations did not violate or restrict the petitioner's First
Amendment rights.5 9 The government asserted that the regulations
only kept the petitioner from using CPNI to target customers and did
not prohibit or limit communication between the petitioner and its
customers, thereby eliminating the implication of the First
Amendment. 6 0 The court stated that the government's argument was
"fundamentally flawed" because the First Amendment protects both
the speaker and the audience and "a restriction on either of these
components is a restriction on speech." 61 Thus, the court dismissed the
government's argument by first extracting the notion of targeted
speech from the relationship between a speaker and a composite
audience, and then by equating speech designed for a particular
audience with speech designed for a larger random audience for all
intensive purposes of implicating the First Amendment. 62 Finally, the
court went on to conclude that the purpose of petitioner's targeted
speech was solicitation, and in turn, the targeted speech qualified as
commercial speech. 63 Following the court's reasoning, the regulations
implicated the First Amendment by restricting protected commercial
speech. 64 (Both parties stipulated that the commercial speech based on
CPNI was truthful and not misleading.) 65
2. Does Government Have a Substantial Interest in Regulating Use of
CPNI?
The government argued that the CPNI regulations advanced
two substantial state interests: customer privacy and promoting
competition. 66 Although the court conceded that concerns for privacy
compelled the enactment of Section 222 of the TCA, it concluded that
unless the government could specifically state and justify the privacy
interest, the second prong of the Central Hudson analysis could not be
satisfied.67 Moreover, the court stated that "in the context of a speech
restriction imposed to protect privacy by keeping certain information
confidential, the government must show that the dissemination of the
information.. .would inflict specific and significant harm on
individuals." 6 8 The court then inferred from the CPNI Order, with
reservation, that disclosure of CPNI could be embarrassing for some
individuals and therefore, could constitute harm on the individual.69
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However, it questioned whether the privacy interest was truly
substantial and assumed, "for sake of the appeal," that the government
asserted a substantial interest in shielding consumers from the
disclosure of sensitive and embarrassing information. 70
The court rejected the government's asserted interest in
competition. 71 The court went on to conclude that even though the
broad purpose of the TCA is to promote competition, Section 222 is
designed to promote customer privacy.72 Because the court viewed
these two purposes as conflicting, it decided that Section 222's attempt
to balance competitive and privacy interests contradicts the procompetitive purpose of the TCA.73 Additionally, the court addressed
three considerations that fostered its conclusion: (1) the plain language
of Section 222 deals mainly with privacy; (2) Section 222 is different
from prior CPNI restrictions formulated to advance competition
because it applies to all telecommunications carriers, not just the chief
ones, which according to the court, indicates restriction on
competition; (3) Section 222 allows for full use of CPNI if customer
approval is procured. 74 Based on these considerations and the overall
purpose of Section 222, the 10th Circuit concluded that the
government's asserted interest in competition, alone, did not justify the
CPNI restrictions. 75 At the same time that the court concluded that
competition was not the primary purpose in the enactment of Section
222, the court stated that it would consider the government's asserted
interest in competition in conjunction with the government's asserted
interest in protecting consumer privacy which in turn, led the court to
the next prong of the Central Hudson analysis. 76
3. Do the Regulations Directly Advance the Government's Interest?
The court began its analysis of the third prong of the Central
Hudson test by identifying the government's burden as it relates to the
third prong: "The government must demonstrate that the harms it
recites are real and that its restriction will in fact alleviate them to a
material degree." 77 The court determined that the government failed to
provide any evidence indicating that the harm to either privacy or
competition was real. 78 The court stated that the government presented
no evidence as to how disclosure might occur, or that disclosure of
CPNI would actually occur, and therefore, the government's concern
that dissemination of the information might cause embarrassment was
an unsupported abstract concern. 79 Similarly, the court concluded that
the government provided no analysis to show how allowing carriers to
market new services by means of CPNI might deter competition, or if
Loyola Consumer Law ReviewV
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that might actually occur.80
4. Are Regulations Narrowly Tailored?
The court stated that even if the government asserted
substantial interests in privacy and competition and the regulations
directly advanced those interests, the FCC regulations are not properly
tailored to the objective.8 1 According to the court, "in order for a
regulation to satisfy this final Central Hudson prong, there must be a fit
between the legislature's means and its desired objective - 'a fit that is
not necessarily perfect, but reasonable; that represents not necessarily
the single best disposition but one whose scope is in proportion to the
interest served."' 82 Thus, the means chosen by the government have to
be "narrowly tailored" to the government's objective. 83
The government argued that the record provided ample support
that the regulations were narrowly tailored because a U.S. West, Inc.
study showed that when affirmatively asked for approval to use CPNI,
a majority of individuals denied authorization. 84 Furthermore, the
study demonstrated that 33% of individuals who were called refused
to grant approval to use their CPNI, 28% granted approval, and 39%
hung up or asked not to be called again. 85 In addition, the government
argued that it could "rely upon its common sense judgment based on
experience, notwithstanding the inclusiveness of the rulemaking
record."8 6
The court refused to extend the "common sense judgment" rule
to the government in the case at hand because the FCC's common
sense judgment could only support a finding that it acted rationally in
promulgating the regulations, and under Central Hudson, the
government must also prove that the regulations were narrowly
tailored.87 Here, the court rejected U.S. West, Inc.'s study as insufficient
evidence that customers do not want carriers to use their CPNI,
thereby renouncing the government's belief that the regulations were
narrowly tailored.88 In reaching its conclusion that the regulations
were not narrowly tailored, the court noted that the FCC record did
not "adequately show that an opt-out strategy (one in which customer
approval for the use of CPNI is inferred until the customer opts-out of
such use) would not sufficiently protect consumer privacy." 89
Furthermore, the court stated that the absence of a discussion
regarding the implications of an opt-out strategy in the FCC record
"hardly reflects the careful calculation of costs and benefits that our
commercial speech jurisprudence requires." 90
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5. The 10 th Circuit'sHolding
The Court held that the government failed to consider First
Amendment implications when it promulgated regulations pursuant
to Section 222 of the TCA.91 According to the court, even if the
government's asserted interests were substantial, the FCC failed to
justify its decision to adopt an opt-in procedure. 92 Following its own
reasoning, the court held that the regulations failed to satisfy the
Central Hudson four-part test and therefore, the regulations, at the very
least, raise constitutional doubt.93 Because the 10th Circuit found that
the FCC's raise serious constitutional concern, the court did not give
the regulations deference under Chevron. As a result, the court vacated
the FCC's CPNI Order and the regulations adopted in connection
therewith. 94
IV. ANALYSIS
A. The First Amendment Challenge
The 10th Circuit did not answer whether the FCC regulations
implicated the First Amendment. The CPNI Order properly noted,
"Carriers remain free to communicate with present or potential
what carriers
customers about the full range of services they offer ...
is
not permitted
in
a
manner
that
CPNI
cannot do is use confidential
95
by the statute." At the very least, the CPNI Order impacts a carrier's
ability to target certain customers for marketing purposes by requiring
it to obtain express instead of implied approval. 96 Instead of
concentrating on the method of approval adopted by the regulations,
the 10th Circuit improperly focused on the usage of CPNI as defined by
Section 222.97 By doing so, the court addressed the constitutionality of
Section 222, not the method of approval adopted by the FCC.
Therefore, the court's analysis under CentralHudson was immaterial.
B. The FCC's Interpretationof Section 222 Is Worthy of Chevron Deference
The plain language of the Section 222(c)(1) clearly indicates that
Congress intended for telecommunications carriers to obtain customer
approval prior to using, disclosing, or sharing CPNI.98 When Congress
does not explicitly define a statutory term, a court should read the
term in accordance with its "ordinary or natural meaning." 99 Judge
Briscoe, the dissent in U.S. West, properly noted that although
Congress did not specifically define the term "approval" in Section
Loyola Consumer Law Review
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222(c)(1), the term's ordinary and natural meaning implies an
informed decision, thereby indicating that "Congress intended for
customers to make an informed decision as to whether they would
allow their CPNI to be used."100
However, Section 222(c)(1) is ambiguous as to what method or
form of approval carriers may use to obtain CPNI.101 Since the statute
is ambiguous in this sense, the question then becomes whether the
agency interpretation is reasonable. 102 Following Congress' purpose to
balance both competitive and consumer privacy interests, the CPNI
Order concluded that an opt-in approach to customer approval was
the best way to further Congress' purpose:
"In order to implement this provision (Section 222), we
therefore mustdetermine what method of approval will
best further both privacy and competitive interests, while
preserving the customer's ability to control
dissemination of sensitive information. We conclude,
contrary to the position of a number of parties, that an
express approval mechanism is the best means to
implement this provision because it will minimize any
unwanted or unknowing disclosure of CPNI."103
Where the opt-out approach burdens the consumer by requiring him to
exert extra effort to protect his confidential information, the opt-in
approach alleviates the burden by assuring the customer his right to
privacy. Clearly, an express approval method is the most reasonable
interpretation in light of Congress' purpose. The FCC regulations
adopting the opt-in approach should have been upheld.
V. IMPACT
The 10th Circuit's decision exhibits a disregard for consumer
privacy and control issues. By vacating the CPNI Order which adopts a
prior express approval method, the court overlooked the consumer's
genuine concern for privacy and control over personal information.
The consumer is left in the hands of the carrier who has little to no
interest for the consumer's privacy.
In a telecommunications carrier-customer relationship, the
consumer should pay a carrier for a telecommunications service and in
turn, the carrier should provide the service without violating the
consumer's privacy. However, this very simple notion becomes
complicated when the telecommunications carrier must obtain
Volume 12, Number 1 1999
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information which is essential to the provision of the service, but
which is ultimately the consumer's personal information. The carrier is
benefitting two-fold. Not only is the carrier receiving money from the
consumer for the service, it is obtaining confidential information from
the consumer which it uses to market other products and services. As a
result of this unequal exchange between carrier and consumer, and
without federal regulation and court decisions balancing the
competing interests between consumer and carrier, the carrier is in a
better position to serve its own interest in making a profit, while the
consumer, often unknowingly, relinquishes control over personal
information which aids the carrier's venture.
The 10th Circuit decision to ignore the inherent unequal
relationship between a carrier and a consumer gives free reign to
carriers to exploit the consumer. The court's ruling does not promote
good business and competition. It simply creates an incentive for
existing carriers and those looking to build a telecommunications
business to do whatever they want within the industry without fear of
government intrusion, even if it means exploiting the people. The
court's outright distaste for an opt-in method of approval for the use of
CPNI, flies in the face of Congress and ultimately, the people.
VI. CONCLUSION
The 10th Circuit, in U.S. West v. FCC, failed to accept the FCC's
consumer-focused attempt to implement Section 222 of the TCA.
Instead, the court ruled that the FCC rules violated the First
Amendment. The court reversed the opt-in method of consumer
approval regarding use, disclosure, and access to CPNI. The court's
decision gives carriers permission to make use of CPNI for purposes of
widespread marketing without having to obtain prior express
approval. If the decision stands, the carrier has implied approval from
the consumer to use CPNI, unless the consumer opts-out.
Unfortunately, the consumer ends up paying his hard-earned dollar to
lose control over personal information.
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54. 467 U.S. at 837 (1984); see also 5 U.S.C. §706.
55. 5 U.S.C. §706(2)(A)-(B).
56. 467 U.S. at 837.
57. 182 F3d. at 1230.
58. See id. (citing Rust v. Sullivan and New York, 500 U.S. 173 (1991)).
59. 182 F.3d at 1232.
60. See id.
61. Id. (citing Virginia State Bd., 425 U.S. at 756-757).
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62. See id. (stating that "a restriction on speech tailored to a particular audience,
'targeted speech,' cannot be cured simply by the fact that a speaker can speak to a
larger indiscriminate audience, 'broadcast speech"').
63. See id. at 1233.
64. See id.
65. Id.
66. See id. at 1234.
67. See id. at 1234. (examining the concept of privacy in broad terms and concluded
that the expansive scope of privacy requires "particular attention to attempts by the
government to assert privacy as a substantial state interest")
68. See id. at 1235. Examples of harm included embarrassment, ridicule, harassment,
or misappropriation.
69. See id. at 1235. (examining portions of the CPNI Order which state that CPNI
involves personal information ... "such as to whom, where, and when a customer
places a call, as well as the types of service offerings to which the customer
subscribes" (quoting CPNI Order 12).
70. See id. at 1235.
71. See id. at 1236.
72. See id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. See id. at 1237.
76. See id.
77. Id. (quoting Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 771 (1993) which states: "This burden
is not satisfied by mere speculation or conjecture.").
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. See id. at 1238.
81. See id.
82. Id. (quoting Bd. of Trustees of the State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. at 480 (1989)).
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83. Id. (stating that "while clearly the government need not employ the least
restrictive means to accomplish its goal, it must utilize a means that is 'narrowly
tailored' to its desired objective") (citing FloridaBar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. at 632
(1995)).
84. See id. at 1239; see also CPNI Order T 100.
85. 182 F.3d. at 1239.
86. See id. (citing FCC v. Nat'l Citizens Comm'n for Broad., 436 U.S. at 775 (1978)).
87. See id. at 1239.
88. See id. (stating that "the results may simply reflect that a substantial number of
individuals are ambivalent or disinterested in the privacy of their CPNI or that
consumers are averse to marketing generally").
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. See id. at 1240.
92. See id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. See CPNI Order 9 106.
96. See id.

86.

97. 182 F.3d at 1244 (Briscoe, dissent stating that "[alithough the majority attempts to
explain how the CPNI Order impacts U.S. West's free speech rights, its analysis is
frustratingly vague. Instead, the majority strays from the narrow scope of the CPNI
Order and effectively takes into account the statutory restrictions on CPNI usage.
Unfortunately, this error permeates not only the majority's threshold analysis of
whether the CPNI Order implicates U.S. West's free speech rights, but its subsequent
First Amendment analysis as well").
98. See 47 U.S.C.A §222(c)(1).
99. Smith v .United States, 508 U.S. 223, 228 (1993).
100. 182 F.3d at 1241.
101. See CPNI Order $ 87.
102. 467 U.S. at 843.
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103. CPNI Order

87.
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